Emergency Governance Proposal — fONG Oracle Failure & Liquidity Freeze Author: Community MemberNetwork: BNB ChainStatus: Work In Progress (Request for Discussion)

Discussion
1
  1. Overview

This proposal raises a structural issue currently affecting the fONG market in Wing Flash Pool (BNB Chain).

An oracle malfunction is causing cascading failures in liquidity calculations for accounts that have entered the fONG market.

As a result, certain users are experiencing a liquidity freeze condition, where exiting markets or redeeming assets becomes impossible.

This WIP outlines the issue and presents remediation options for governance consideration.

  1. Relevant Contracts (BNB Chain)

Comptroller:
0x91cB061F29c37012daa29f8E5ABE180FD415d9FA

fONG Market:
0x7ab3a7059ebc247b25df7b492548c5e2737db84f

fUSDC Market (reference for reserve activity):
0xE21b6194903282772BCF40FEf6848F28F50B51EE

Admin Wallet:
0x90Dac303c9bCF43cb6E31eEdAd999490670F387E

Recent reserve reduction:
Tx Hash: 0xfc8b2d20a1227225ac73201393d26d2843f4d06efd0340c2d2a5b4bec0ada5de
Block: 83175543
Function: _reduceReserves(uint256)
Amount: 10,000 USDC

  1. Technical Background

Observed behavior for accounts entered in fONG:

  • getUnderlyingPrice(fONG) reverts

  • getAccountLiquidity() reverts

  • exitMarket(fONG) reverts

  • redeem() reverts (including other markets)

  • The issue occurs even when borrow = 0

Example failing call:

IPriceOracle.getUnderlyingPrice(fONG)
→ execution reverted: “priceAddress is invalid”

Because the Comptroller iterates through all entered markets,
the oracle revert propagates to the entire liquidity calculation,
creating a systemic lock for affected accounts.

  1. Impact

  • Users cannot exit the fONG market.

  • Other supplied collateral becomes partially immobilized.

  • New users may unknowingly enter a frozen state.

  • Governance transparency risk increases.

This issue is architectural, not market-driven.

  1. Governance Remediation Options

Option A — Repair / Replace the ONG Oracle
Update the price feed so getUnderlyingPrice() no longer reverts.
Effect: Restores normal liquidity calculations.

Option B — Disable fONG Market
Prevent new enterMarket() calls and additional exposure.
Effect: Stops expansion of freeze cases.

Option C — Set collateralFactor(fONG) = 0
Remove fONG from liquidity collateral calculations.
Effect: Neutralizes dependency on failing oracle.

Option D — Emergency Force Exit
Allow forced exitMarket() bypassing oracle dependency
OR remove fONG membership from affected accounts.
Effect: Immediate restoration of user liquidity access.

  1. Recommended Path

  2. Disable fONG market immediately.

  3. Publicly acknowledge the oracle malfunction.

  4. Implement oracle repair or collateral neutralization.

  5. Introduce revert-protection in liquidity loop to prevent recurrence.

  1. Request for Clarification

The community requests:

  • Confirmation that the oracle issue is acknowledged.

  • Clarification on remediation path.

  • Estimated timeline for resolution.

Transparent communication will reinforce governance credibility.

Submitted in good faith to restore:

  • Protocol integrity

  • User liquidity access

  • Governance transparency

Open for discussion before formal on-chain submission.

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